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This research explores the evolution of co-operation among different types of
intermediaries in the UK and Mexican financial systems and provides an international
comparison. In it we focus on how and why collaboration between commercial banks
and non-bank financial competitors emerged in the context of the external innovations
that modified the contestability of bank markets. Changes in Mexican banking
consider collaboration between commercial banks and small regional banks, with an
emphasis on the 1945 to 1975 period. The success of collaboration, between non-bank
and non-finance providers to modify competitive capabilities and competitive
challenges, in UK deposit markets is the benchmark for co-operation in Mexican
banking. Business histories in the UK and Mexico show how some relations emerged
out of integration strategies, with the purpose of establishing financial conglomerates.
Other banks and non-bank providers in Mexico and the UK sought to create co-
operative agreements that developed competitive capabilities and allowed barriers to
enter deposit markets to be circumvented. As a result, the research sheds light on the
success of collaboration agreements through changes in competitive strength rather
than the longevity of the transaction or the formality and structural visibility of the
agreements.
JEL Classification: Comparative Financial Markets (N20), Market Structure (L10),
Networks (L22).3
  1.  Introduction
Alton Gilbert’s
1 landmark compilation warned that, conspicuously absent from the
analysis of structure-conduct-performance in banking, was an assessment of the
effects regulatory change has had in determining bank performance. It was until
recently, however, that an important number of contributions thoroughly debated the
economic role of market competition, its benefits and its workings in financial
mediation
2. This paper contributes to research into the effects of regulation on
performance in bank markets by looking into how and why collaboration between
commercial banks and non-bank financial competitors emerges in the context of
changed competition (as reflected by distinct competitive environments in Mexico
and the UK). The combination of secondary sources and previously unavailable
archival material, suggests a wide spectrum in the organisational forms adopted by
collaborators. What is distinctive about the forms of collaboration explored in this
paper is the focus on the importance attributed to assessing market potential as the
driver that brought collaborators together.
Collaboration in markets with a handful of participants can enable those with
fewer resources and capabilities to absorb market intelligence without disrupting
competitive equilibria. At the same time, collaboration can enable the creation of
inter-organisational processes and procedures to distribute otherwise inaccessible
information. Competitive collaboration, therefore, can provide advantages to financial
intermediaries established in markets such as Mexican banking, where incomplete
information is pervasive and there are acute asymmetries between principal and agent.
Collaboration is also of interest for managers of banks working in competitive but
otherwise geographically segmented markets, such as the UK retail financial services
in the post war period, as a cost effective alternative to implementing geographic
diversification prior to per capita income rising. Hence, both the context of a closed
economy with a financial system in the early stages of development and in the context
of an industrial economy with a developed financial system, inter-firm co-operation
proved to be a relatively successful organisational response to market constraints.
Research results, into the formation and evolution of inter-firm collaboration in
banking, suggested that collaboration allowed participants in Mexican and UK
banking to internalise competencies and learn from their associates while co-operation4
aimed to overcome regulatory and environmental restrictions to market penetration.
Research results advance the literature discussing organisational alliances and
collaboration in general, by suggesting that the assessment of market potential is
critical to instigating collaboration while implementing related and semi-related
diversification. Specifically, this paper documents evidence pointing towards
established participants and potential entrants in bank markets seeking collaboration
to inform strategic actions that could lead to activities associated with high sunk costs,
such as the development of retail branch banking distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a review of analytic categories
and research design. Section 3 summarises the structure of Mexican and UK banking
markets with an emphasis on the 1945-1975 period. Section 4 considers associations
that emerged out of strategies of competitive collaboration. This through cases on the
relationship between Mexican commercial banks, as well as cases on the role of
finance houses (non-bank, purchase-hire, intermediaries) in the strategy of UK
commercial banks. Section 5 explores a second theme through alliances that create
co-operative agreements, circumventing barriers to entering bank markets and
developing competitive capabilities. This is illustrated through co-operative links of
Mexican commercial banks as well as collaboration between savings and clearing
banks in Scotland. Section 6 offers a summary and tentative conclusions.
  2.  Understanding Competitive Collaboration
In the literature, regulation has been viewed as mitigating competition as well as
hindering the adoption of technological innovation
3. Regulatory innovations
developing into barriers to enter the markets for financial services in general and
commercial banking in particular, can be traced to bank charters in the late eighteenth
century. However, it was until 1960
4 when concerns were raised regarding the design
of an optimal banking structure when, responding to a ruling of the Supreme Court,
US government agencies had to consider the anti-trust effects of mergers in banking.
More recently after a period of intense regulatory change during the 1970s and 1980s,
the potential for fraud, money laundering and systemic failure impinged supervision,
regulation and minimum capital requirement as prerequisites to participate in bank
markets
5.5
External change (such as regulatory innovations) can modify competition in bank
markets. There are several potential strategic responses of actual and potential
participants in banking to external innovations and competitive collaboration is one of
them. However, competitive collaboration, as undertaken by participants in banking
during the second half of the twentieth century, seems to be an under-researched
organisational form
6. Moreover, practitioner and academic research on inter-firm co-
operation has predominately focused attention on cross-border growth of banking
institutions while excluding the assessment of collaboration amongst banks, non-bank
and non-finance intermediaries with the potential of contesting domestic bank
markets
7.
In this paper research into competitive collaboration between banks and non-
banks as well as between banks, non-banks and non-finance organisations aiming to
contest bank markets proceeded through an historical evaluation of associations in
two different competitive environments and provides an international comparison.
The assessment of the evolution of competitive collaboration could determine the
success of collaboration agreements through changes in competitive strength rather
than on the longevity of the transaction or the formality and structural visibility of
agreements
8.
Firms engage in competitive collaboration through strategic alliances,
outsourcing agreements, product licensing, co-operative research and an extended
range of ‘rights’ (including rights to sell or buy). Such strategies allow partners in the
transaction to achieve critical scale in a competency, distribution capability or markets
currently out of their reach
9. According to this view, the main value of competitive
collaboration for individual organisations is co-operation turning into a form of inter-
partner learning
10. There is an evolutionary context to this view because learning
implies adaptation and change, and indeed an important analytical stream has focused
on the evolution of collaboration. In other words, the evolution of inter-firm co-
operation is viewed in the broad sense of the life cycle of a product or service, that is,
as a notion of transformation over time and adaptation to contextual and
environmental contingencies.
An alternative view to explore the formation and evolution of collaboration, offers
an overarching framework to assess inter-firm co-operation under two complementary
approaches
11. First, a transactional view based on the degree of integration of firms, a6
continuous scale from market interaction to full vertical integration that places
collaboration as a form of arms-length integration. A second approach is based on
commitment, which emphasises the degree of mutual interdependence between the
parties involved in an alliance. These views together allow a well-structured definition
of the formation of competitive collaboration agreements and the organisational form
they are likely to adopt, as well as offering a consistent reference to study the
evolution and longevity of collaboration agreements.
Understanding the interaction between formation and longevity of collation is
particularly important because evolutionary processes are sensitive to the initial
conditions in which collaboration emerges and takes on its organisational form. Yves
L. Doz has looked at the evolutionary rationale with more precision and explored the
effect of initial conditions on the learning processes (rather than on the outcomes)
12.
Doz studied both successful and failing projects in the context of sequences of
interactive cycles of learning, valuation and adjustment. In particular how the initial
conditions are important to create progressing patterns of learning as well as
adaptation. Such patterns of learning, according to Doz, are rooted in how cognitive-
individual learning evolves into behavioural-organisational learning. Initial conditions
may foster or block both types of learning and how learning process are reviewed
themselves (learning to learn) by individuals and the organisation itself.
In this paper, evidence from building societies and non-bank intermediaries in the
UK shows how collaboration permitted the latter to offer services out of their scope.
Evidence from Mexican banking illustrates how small commercial banks associated
themselves with  larger entities to achieve scale in business processes such as credit
cards, international banking and trust operations. As a result, fieldwork in this paper
clearly illustrates how, through collaboration, firms expect to avoid unnecessary
investments (i.e. enhance the allocation of scare financial resources), gain time to
improve their productive efficiency and quality control, and acquire their partners’
skills and market characteristics. Indeed, empirical-inductive evidence
13 suggests that
co-operation and alliances are a transitional step for further interaction between
otherwise independent  organisations, that could lead to integrated forms of
management and certainly to the internalisation of partner skills.
Firms are free to enter any particular relationship provided there is a minimum
common agreement, there is a clear perception of potential benefits and there is no7
indication that the negotiations themselves will create significant irrecoverable costs.
To date, however, disagreement prevails on whether collaboration strategies deliver
sustainable competitive advantage. Some are sceptical that networks of independent
firms can articulate long-term management of interdependence
14. Others argue that
collaboration strategies reflect changes in competitive tactics because they can
effectively increase market competition through increased entry threats
15. Throughout
these perspectives, however, possibilities that environmental turbulence creates sunk
(i.e. irrecoverable) organisational costs and deters entry have often been ignored.
Barriers to exit may develop ex-post as firms enter into particular agreements
16. For
instance, the posibility of environmental turbulence in the UK developing into sunk
organisational costs, helps to explain why the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS)
failed to commit to a collaboration agreement with a building society and thus, CWS
abandoned opportunities to diversify in UK retail bank markets.
Cases in this paper, such as CWS’s potential diversification, highlight how seldom
the discussion around competitive collaboration considers whether co-operation
responds to opportunistic diversification strategies that pursue income growth rather
than enhancement of core capabilities. Documented evidence in this paper thus offers
cases of strategic visioning but failed implementation in the UK. Whereas cases in
Mexican banking document opportunistic but otherwise successful collaboration,
which moved forward on flexible organisational structures (escaping  the budgetary
rigour associated with the pursuit of strategic intent).
Development and transformation of the competitive capabilities of one or all of
the partners should be seen as the appropriate indicator for successful collaboration
17.
For instance, this paper offers details on how Trustee Savings Bank aimed to
transform their capabilities in Scotland through collaboration with a commercial bank
and how a Mexican commercial bank (i.e.  Banamex) helped to transform the
capabilities of its associates in Mexican regional bank markets.
In what follows the research explores competitive collaboration by taking the
view that the only (relevant) costs to enter a market are those known to be sunk and
which become exit barriers
18. From the ‘contestable market’ perspective the degree of
competition diminishes through means other than those facilitating collusion or
reducing the number of independent participants. Competitive pressures are lower to
the extent that known sunk costs reduce the threat of out-of-market participants8
entering the market. Strategic orientation is important to anticipate competitive
advantage, including withstanding environmental turbulence unexpectedly turning
idiosyncratic investments into exit barriers.
On the other hand, given the lack of widely accepted definitions of co-operative
activity the discussion of inter-firm co-operation risks flounders because of the failure
to specify the exact form of collaboration
19. Inter-firm relations take many forms and
serve many purposes. Hence, it is useful to differentiate what part of the value chain is
the focus of the agreement. Also whether there is (tacit or implicit) co-operation for
direct involvement as measured by equity in joint ventures or the appointment of
liaison managers
20. Secondly, whether participants have clear goals and shared
expectations
21. Fuzzy objectives prevent designing adequate risk/reward agreements
while asymmetric expectations of the various participants result in varying levels of
commitment (i.e. a participant’s willingness to develop idiosyncratic resources).
Thirdly, the  extent to which collaboration will complement pre-collaboration
activities, operates to the disadvantage of other collaboration agreements and limit the
agreement to original signatories
22. Finally, whether co-operation is a pro-active (i.e.
offensive) or reactive (i.e. defensive) response to uncertainty and environmental
turbulence
23.
In summary, the evolving nature of competitive collaboration and of any form of
inter-organisational dynamics is the motivation for analysing cases with a historical
perspective. An historical view of an economic problem requires interweaving
conceptual structures with contextual events and identifying how and why transitions
appear. In this sense the research that follows aims to bring the history back to the
concepts using as evidence the comparative historical cases of Mexico and the UK.
Rather than providing an explanatory hypothesis to a problem, it aims to show how
and why those business practices emerged in their respective contexts and explain
their outcome in the light of conceptual tools.
  3.  Environmental Turbulence and Strategy in Banking
  3.i 
From 1945 until 1982 when all but two commercial banks were nationalised,
participants in Mexican banking markets experienced an unprecedented development
on the back of a relatively stable environment. Banking activity expanded in terms of9
the number of firms and scale of activity. By 1940 less than fifty commercial banks
operated, that number increased to 97 in 1945 and to 105 in 1971. The number of
retail bank branches also increased from 265 branches in 1945, to 901 in 1960 and
1,777 in 1971.  Financieras (non-bank intermediaries), the second most important
private intermediary after commercial banks, also grew. By 1940 less than forty
financieras operated. In 1945 they were 84, and 97 in 1965. However, the four-firm
ratio on loans between 1945 and 1980 remained between 40 and 50 per cent of the
market
24. In other words, in spite of economic growth a reduced number of
participants had large shares of the market for deposits, loans and term investments.
This suggested that commercial banks and particularly those bigger in terms of assets,
benefited from organised capital markets being unavailable to most non-finance
organisations.
Nevertheless, the emergence of new intermediaries coupled with economic growth
was reflected in the growth of financial transactions. The overall level of financial
activity increased in absolute terms and also with respect to gross national product
(GDP). For example, as a measure of increasing financial deepening, the proportion
of total loans of private financial intermediaries over GDP was 7 per cent in 1945, 9
per cent in 1960, and 19 per cent in 1970. The sum of total loans per capita, indexed
to pesos of 1978, was $1,376 in 1945, $2,087 in 1955, $3,425 in 1960 and $9,046 in
1970. These measures are relatively modest if compared with economies showing
larger financial development. However they are significant considering that in the
1930s the Mexican financial system emerged out of the ashes after its almost total
collapse during the 1910 to 1921 revolution. Two important factors that also
contributed to a low population’s access to financial services were Mexico’s uneven
geography and little investments, in the early stage of development, on transportation
and communication systems. In this way, Mexico characterised as an economy
segmented into clearly identifiable regional markets rather than as one integrated
national market. The structure of the banking industry reflected this segmentation.
Regulation specifying financial requirements and conditions for the establishment
of bank markets dated to 1924 and was later amended in 1941. This banking law
remained the main statutory legal code until the late 1990s. Regulation specified strict
separation of activities in financial markets and typified activities for specialised
financial intermediaries. Commercial banks were restricted to loan provision, deposit10
taking, and trust operations. Regulation thus limited the number of activities within
broader opportunities for brokering the financial needs of surplus- and deficit-
spending agents as well as maintaining the national payment system. However, low
per capita income and fragmented regional markets for goods and services also
limited banks’ diversification.
The predominant form for distributing financial services was through proprietary
channels such as retail bank branch networks. Nevertheless, collaboration with
regional players or non-bank participants allowed banks to increase their geographic
scope and to provide services commercial banks were otherwise unable to offer.
Collaboration was an attractive way of implementing growth strategies of commercial
banks that would prevail over reserve requirement regulations, over regulations
constraining the maturity term of loans and over other environmental limitations. In
particular, commercial banks used  financieras (a non-bank intermediary), trust
organisations and mortgage banks as affiliates to overcome regulatory restrictions on
loan expansion.
Collaboration between banks and non-banks was diverse ranging from loose links
with independent participants up to integrated operations, as collaboration sometimes
ended in full ownership. Collaboration was also influenced by commercial banks and
affiliated financial organisations being embedded in larger business groups. The
association of banks and non-banks developed in the early 1940s, primarily through
the establishment of non-banking organisations by business groups with a controlling
stake in bank capital. Links between banks and non-banks were then expected to
develop through repeated custom and preferential access (i.e. relationship banking).
Growth in the strength and diversity of collaboration forced regulators to re-assess
conditions for establishing in Mexican bank markets. In 1970 modifications to the
banking law acknowledged the collaboration between banks and affiliates in the
provision of financial services. The legal recognition of otherwise evident ownership
linkages and intensified operational relationships among financial organisations
culminated in 1975, with regulatory changes that allowed the amalgamation of banks
and non-bank financial intermediaries into multi-bank entities
25. Note that multi-
banks or banca múltiple emerged from the amalgamation of commercial banks with
specialised financial firms otherwise working in different market segments. Contrary
to the belief that multi-banks were a form of universal banking, they were never11
allowed to legally operate as investment banks nor to offer bankassurance although
their corporate governance made them suitable to operate as such.
  3.ii 
Developments in Mexican markets were benchmarked with those in the UK
because the UK always had a large and highly competitive wholesale banking markets
and preceded other countries in regulatory change. Important features of the UK
banking system included the absence of a formal statutory banking law, readiness to
welcome the establishment of foreign banks and freedom for domestic banks to
engage in international trade and to establish abroad
26.
As in Mexican banking, a reduced number of large organisations dominated the
market for domestic deposits in the UK. This feature dated to the amalgamation
process that swept through UK banking after the introduction of limited liability
banking during the late nineteenth century. By 1900 ten clearing banks captured 46
per cent of total deposits in England and Wales and by the end of the first world war,
five major clearing banks captured 97 per cent of total deposits
27. The number of
major banks remained stable during the next 50 years while, during the 1950s, UK
commercial banks actively pursued the aim of becoming depository institutions of
excess funds and began to serve mid-income customers. From 1967 to 1973, mergers
reduced yet again the number of clearing banks. By 1977, the top four biggest banks
in terms of assets captured 73 per cent of deposits by UK residents, controlled 58% of
the 12,947 retail bank branches and employed 78 per cent of the 258,065 persons in
the sector
28.
Since 1920 English banking had been free of a major failure until the 1973 to
1974 secondary banking crisis. Operation of the banking system resulted from
conventions agreed between the banks themselves and between banks and monetary
authorities. Between 1950 and 1970 requests of monetary authorities became more
regular and more specific, primarily asking banks (and later most financial
intermediaries) to hold certain type of assets in proportion to their deposit liabilities
29.
In 1971 controls to restrict lending growth to an annual rate as well as qualitative
guidance on the priorities to assign credit were dissolved. In the period of monetary
expansion that followed several smaller financial intermediaries were able to grow
sufficiently to present a competitive challenge to clearing banks
30. However, interest12
rate volatility and economic contraction resulted in the collapse of a number of
intermediaries specialised in high volume, high worth transactions (i.e. secondary
banks). The Bank of England with the clearing banks mounted a rescue operation
through which some organisations ceased to trade or became subsidiaries of larger
banks.
Since the late 1960s UK financial service organisations observed reduced rates of
financial return, raised fees for deposit services, reduced branch operating costs and
shifted to higher earning assets. In other words, external innovations (and in
particular, regulatory change and information technology applications) were
instrumental in the changes banks made to their balance-sheet size, in increasing
business-portfolio diversity and in restructuring their geographic scope
31. Changes in
the size and diversity of banks followed external changes in bank markets but banks'
strategic responses were still short of the competitive (or perfectly contestable market)
benchmark
32.
Documented evidence would thus suggest that, as a result of environmental
innovations, some bank strategies increased competition in bank markets while some
other external changes provided incentives to pursue strategies aiming to deter new
participants entering bank markets (such as deterring insurance companies to supply
unsecured lending).
  4.  Competitive Collaboration as a Strategy
  4.i 
Being the biggest in terms of assets,  Banco  Nacional de  México ( Banamex)
established associations with small provincial banks while increasing the geographic
scope of its loan market. Associations emerged for diverse reasons but chiefly due to
opportunistic responses such as other banks being in financial distress or other banks
taking the initiative to build closer collaboration.
In the case of the banks in financial distress Banco de México, the central bank in
Mexico, would ask Banamex to mount a rescue. In that way the central bank was able
to intervene, have a second party implement reliable monitoring mechanisms and
avoid collapse. Intervention would then proceed without recourse to public funds.13
Examples of collaboration triggered by financial distress were Banco del Pacífico,
Banco Ganadero y Agrícola, Banco del Noroeste de México, and Banco Provincial
del Norte.  Financial contributions by  Banamex were accompanied by strict
monitoring mechanisms. In particular,  Banamex’s executives and senior managers
entered the board of the failing bank. New board members acted with non-executive
powers to oversee restructuring processes and instituted draconian inspection methods
(including outsourcing internal auditing to  Banamex). In fact, restructuring and
inspection were deemed more important than the injection of funds itself. Transferring
expertise alongside financial resources aimed to guarantee that the formerly distressed
bank would service the agreement or, in the case of contributions to share capital,
minimise possibilities that the contribution would turn into loss. Discipline
mechanisms also involved matching financial procedures to those at Banamex.
Associations with financially distressed banks often evolved into a collaboration
with  Banamex but this was not to be the case of  Banco del Pacífico, a commercial
bank operating in the north-western regions of Baja California and Sinaloa. In the
early forties Banco del Pacifico faced solvency problems due to a large proportion of
non-performing loans in its portfolio. Most of the loans were concentrated in a single
borrower, Alberto Alderete, who had been Governor of the northern region of Baja
California and owner of an important brewery as well as other industrial assets.
Alderete received substantial advances from the bank but without proper
documentation as to how the loans were going to be serviced. At the time, evidence
could not be found as to how such large amount of advances had been approved
33.
The central bank considered that Banco del Pacífico should be rescued due to its high
share of deposits in the region and asked Banamex to intervene on its behalf.
By 1945 top Banamex executives had joined the board of Banco del Pacífico as a
means of monitoring the bank’s operations. By 1947 the new board had expelled at
least five of the top executives of Banco del Pacífico and applied corrective measures
to recover the past-due portfolio
34. Banamex advanced funds to Banco del Pacífico,
some of which gave Banamex rights over Banco del  Pacífico’s share capital. As a
result, Banamex retained its participation on the board of Banco del Pacífico well into
1952, when Atanasio G. Saravia and Agustín  Legorreta from  Banamex still enjoyed
non-executive powers and were on the board of  Banco del Pacífico. Shortly after14
Banamex amalgamated with  Banco del Pacífico while turning non-financial assets
into regional branches
35.
Other banks in the north-western region saved from collapse by  Banamex were
Banco del Noroeste and Banco Ganadero y Agrícola, respectively located in the states
of Sinaloa and Sonora. Banco Provincial del Norte, established in the northern state of
Chihuahua, was another bank in financial distress assisted by  Banamex. Figure 1
illustrates the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans for two regional banks.
One of them, Banco del Noroeste, identified as having been in financial distress and
then intervened by Banamex.
Source: Anuario Financiero de México (1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970).
Banco del  Noroeste was established in 1939 and had twelve branches serving
what, at the time, some executives from Banamex considered as an attractive regional
market
36. During the 1950s Banco del Noroeste faced a growing proportion of non-
performing loans which reached almost 20 per cent of the total portfolio. Figure 1
illustrates that in 1950 non-performing loans at Banco del Noroeste already were 10
per cent of total advances. The graph illustrates how this level was high (even when
compared to other financially distressed banks).  Banamex’s board sent  Ladislao
López Negrete. It is unclear when did López Negrete left the bank, but as late as by
1962 he still remained active on the Board of  Banco del  Noroeste. The effects of
corrective measures introduced after López Negrete’s intervention are also shown in
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Figure 1. Non-Performing loans/Total loans15
total loans in 1965.  The trend is also evident in Figure 2 and Table 1, which
illustrates the return on equity for the same sample of banks.
Source: Anuario Financiero de México (1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970).
Figure 2 depicts an important increase in the profitability of Banco del Noroeste
from 1950 to 1965. The return on equity increased from 7 per cent in 1950 to 41 per
cent in 1965, when the average for the industry was between 15 and 20 per cent. After
restructuring Banco del Noroeste, Banamex maintained it as associate (more below).
Table 1: Financial Performance and Banamex’s Intervention  (1950-1970)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Return on Equity
Banco del Noroeste 6.78% N/A N/A 41.79% 28.79%
Banco de Tuxpam N/A N/A 24.15% 29.33% 40.32%
Non-Peforming Loans/Total
Loans
Banco del Noroeste 10.00% N/A N/A 5.86% 5.54%
Banco de Tuxpan N/A N/A 5.21% 1.96% 1.39%
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Other large Mexican banks also developed a collaboration network by taking an
interest in the share capital of smaller banks. From 1935 onwards Banco de Comercio,
the second largest bank in terms of assets, developed a nationwide network of local
banks. Although these links lacked formal managerial integration, banks in Banco de
Comercio’s network behaved as affiliates (i.e. regional subsidiaries) rather than as
associates (i.e. independent collaborators).
Banco de Londres y México, established in 1864, was the oldest and one of the
fourth largest commercial banks in Mexico
37. Originally established as a joint venture
between British and Mexican investors, it was acquired by another group of Mexicans
in the early 1930s. Later on and while aiming to expand its geographic scope along
the US border and in the central Mexico region, Banco de Londres y México took a
stake in the capital of  Banco de Juárez and  Banco de Jalisco. However,  Banco de
Londres also developed formal collaboration agreements with other providers such as
three independent financieras.
In summary, a popular form of collaboration in Mexican markets was  larger
(asset) banks taking a stake in smaller (asset) banks’ share capital as well as
supervising operations through non-executive directors. Direct involvement provided
resilient monitoring mechanisms as well as symmetry in goals and commitment.
Direct involvement seems to have precluded the need to draft detail agreements while
maintaining organisational flexibility. Although pre-collaboration activities clearly
complemented each other, collaboration associated with direct involvement were
rather tactical moves (i.e. defensive responses), where larger banks could use
negotiating advantage to capture residual claims or settle unexpected developments to
their favour. Moreover, evidence is yet to emerge pointing to limitations in the
agreements as to the number of participants. Dyadic partnerships, therefore, seem to
have been the dominant organisational form.
  4.ii 
In the UK, finance houses, savings banks and building societies competed in the
market for deposits with clearing banks (i.e. those controlling the national payment
system and able to issue claims redeemable on demand). Just as it was the case in
Mexico, non-bank providers had great potential to be used as platform for non-finance
providers to contest UK bank markets.17
On the one hand, finance houses were the main organisations providing consumer
finance for purposes other than house purchase and primarily involved in  hire-
purchase lending for private individuals to buy automobiles. Through the hire-
purchase agreement individuals would rent (or hire) the goods but would become
proprietor when the last instalment was paid. Finance houses obtained resources
directly from the general public through retail outlets but most funds developed from
term deposits of large non-profit organisations and from organised money markets
38.
Guidance regulating solvency requirements and the limit of £50,000 above which
consent for the raising of finance houses’ new capital was necessary
39, seems to have
done little in the way of preventing opportunities for the formation of hundreds of
small houses
40. However, most of these remained dormant and it was the larger, bank-
controlled houses which took the greatest share of the market. In 1969 out of a
population of 1,000 finance houses the nine largest accounted for nearly 60 per cent
of total debt outstanding, and the twenty-six largest for 78 per cent
41. Of the total
outstanding no less than 29 per cent was accounted for by four-wholly own
subsidiaries of banks accepting deposits of UK residents and a further 9 per cent by
one finance house jointly owned by two clearing banks
42. Large finance houses were
thus firmly connected to one of the main clearing banks
43. Outside of the eleven
largest, the only other major finance houses were wholly-owned subsidiaries of
companies in motor manufacturing and consumer durables, the largest being Ford
Motor Credit Co. Ltd.
44. Hence, evidence is yet to emerge that non-finance providers
or indeed foreign banks used finance houses to diversify into UK bank markets.
On the other hand, there have been instances where building societies (specialised
savings banks) were used as a platform to enter UK bank markets. Until 1989, when
Abbey National started a trend through which most of its peers converted into banks,
building societies operated as  mutuals and dealt primarily in financing home
acquisitions. Their system of fixed mortgage interest rates reflected the failure of
building societies gaining access to the clearing arrangement of the Committee of
London Clearing Banks (finally resolved in the Building Society Act of 1986). This
failure ensured that building societies could offer deposits withdrawable on demand
but could not offer current accounts and could only engage in payment services
through correspondent banks. Lack of short-term mediation possibilities, excess
supply of long-term funds and low interest rates brought fierce competition amongst18
the building societies
45. The aim of protecting societies from the consequences of
extreme competition together with an environment conducive of cartels and the 1939
Building Societies Act (which restricted their activities to residential mortgages),
encouraged the growth of a trade association called the Building Societies Association
(BSA).
Starting in 1939 the Council of the BSA issued recommended rates for personal
deposits, term investments and mortgages. In effect, the recommended rate system
created a cartel of building societies
46. Under the recommended rate system
competition to acquire mortgages shrank and building societies increasingly gave:
‘...priority to their own savers in the allocation of mortgage funds.’
47
Societies could then reward loyal depositors with pricing for mortgage loans
rather than market interest rates. However, coincident with the passing of the Building
Societies Act came the outbreak of the second world war and so the testing of its
provisions had to wait for a number of years during which public attention was being
drawn elsewhere. In the mean time, competition between building societies structured
round most of them adopting the same interest rates and commission-payment
schemes while customers were forced to maintain patronage of a single institution in
order to qualify for a mortgage loan. A number of small building societies operated on
rates above recommended rates for borrowers or below recommended rates for
deposits but this was an accepted part of building society practice
48 .
Although building societies offered non-bank and non-finance intermediaries
access to services and customer groups previously out of their reach, co-operation
between them was rare
49. One such exceptional occurrence took place between a
building society and the banking arm of a non-finance organisation. This agreement
was forged shortly after the second world war, a time when UK property values had
increased because during the war half a million homes were destroyed or made unfit,
while the number of families had actually grown
50. In 1943, the Co-operative
Permanent Building Society or CPBS (today Nationwide) approached the Co-
operative Wholesale Society (CWS), at the time the biggest producer and retailer in
the UK, to enter discussions in response to the change in property values, aiming to
51:
•  Develop business in the housing market;
•  Encourage more housing societies within the co-operative movement; and19
•  Provide a range of loan producing insurance (through CWS’s wholly owned
insurance subsidiary) well as other expenditure associated with housing and
equipment.
For the CPBS the offer provided unique access to the Co-operative Movement
with its 10m strong community of producers and consumers. However, the real
attractiveness of this potential market depended on CPBS's ability to take advantage
of that special relationship. The deal was formalised when, as a result of the official
meetings, the CPBS modified its rules in 1944. For the first time in its history, CPBS
appointed representatives of the CWS and the Scottish CWS onto its management
board
52. The  CWS's ambitions in financial services were also reflected in the
application by the CWS Bank, a wholly owned CWS subsidiary established in 1872
(and the only co-operative bank in the UK), for membership of the Committee of
London Clearing Banks
53. The application was refused on grounds not publicly
disclosed but the CWS Bank was formally admitted in 1975.
Opportunities of having identified customer loyalty as a competitive strength and
the collaboration that ensued never came to be. The CWS and Scottish CWS failed to
invite nominations of the  CPBS’s directors to either one of their Boards. Links
between the CWS and CPBS were limited to the latter, making insurance referrals on
the same terms as any other agent of the Co-operative Insurance Society. Moreover,
CPBS’s organic expansion attracted members and clients which were overwhelmingly
outside of the Co-operative Moment. Simultaneously, CPBS’ agencies within the Co-
operative Movement failed to generate mortgage referrals while co-operative societies
(including CWS wholly owned subsidiaries) consistently withdraw term deposits
54.
The CPBS’s directors then took advantage of the approaching retirement of CWS and
Scottish CWS representatives to their Board, stopped making nominations and in
1965 the alliance formally ended.
In summary, collaboration with building societies had the potential of allowing
non-bank and non-finance providers to challenge bank markets while offering
diversification opportunities for banks product/service portfolio. Collaboration could
be an attractive way to complement pre-collaboration activities. The issue being the
extent to which collaboration would contribute to achieve strategic intent
55 as well as
commitment and share expectations to achieve that intent. Interestingly, in both
Mexican and UK markets collaboration moved forward with a very loose agreement20
but with the appointment of representatives to the smaller partner’s Board.  This
would suggest that monitoring and commitment from the larger partner (rather than
the one with the critical capabilities) seems to be the key for the success of the
agreement itself. Monitoring provided a low cost alternative to gather market
intelligence, sort out uncertainty and enhance the assessment of potential investments.
The nature and intensity of commitment from the bigger participant thus helps
typifying whether collaboration was, on balance, a proactive (i.e. offensive) or
reactive (i.e. defensive) response to environmental turbulence.
  5.  Developing Capabilities through Co-operation
  5.i 
Collaboration in Mexican banking took place between independent providers and
without the recourse of making share capital contributions. Starting in the early 1940s
some banks undertook agreements for the provision of services and business
collaboration. In the vernacular these agreements were called ‘associated banks’,
bancos asociados. Most collaborations took the form of strategic alliances between
regional players and larger participants, characterised with head office in Mexico City
and with nation wide operations. Table 2 summarises collaboration agreements
developed between small regional banks and large banks
56.
There are four reasons that could, together, explain competitive collaboration in
Mexican banking. First large commercial banks offering second and third party
processing to decreased scale and capital disadvantages in the provision of many
services. Through associations large banks could enjoy economies of scale without
management discontinuities and hence, reduce overall cost levels. Second, there was a
reputation effect when smaller banks were perceived as within the strategic remit of
large banks, collaboration would then have an element associated with greater
stability and solvency. Third, through collaboration smaller banks could access
otherwise unavailable skills and expertise. And fourth, through collaboration smaller
banks had preferential access to inter-bank funding. This as large banks expanded
their activities by offering rediscounting loan facilities to smaller banks.21
Table 2: Strategic Alliances in Mexican Banking (1940-1975)
Leading Bank Associated Banks
Banco Nacional de México (Banamex),
one of the two largest in terms of assets.
Banco del Pacífico, Banco Ganadero,
Banco del Estado de México, Banco de
Tuxpam, Banco Ganadero y Agrícola,
Banco del Noroeste de México, Banco
Provincial de Norte, Banco del Sureste,
Banco del Centro, Banco de Oriente and
Banco Agrícola e Industrial de Linares.
Banco Comercial Mexicano, one of the
fourth largest in terms of assets.
Sources of 1957 indicate that they were
Banco de La Laguna, Banco Comercial
de la República, Banco Comercial de
Veracruz, Banco de Oaxaca and Banco
Comercial de Jalisco. By 1958 Banco
Ganadero de Camargo had joined them.
By 1974 Banco Comercial Mexicano de
Monterrey, Banco Comercial Mexicano
de Tamaulipas, Banco Comercial
Peninsular also joined this network.
Banco de Londres y México, one of the
four largest in terms of assets.
Financiera de Nuevo León, Financiera del
Norte and Financiera Crédito de
Monterrey.
Banco Internacional, one of the ten
largest in terms of assets.
In 1965 they were Banco Provincial de
Sinaloa, Banco Industrial de Jalisco,
Banco de Yucatán, Banco de Nogales,
Banco del Centro, Banco de Zamora and
Banco de Oaxaca. In 1968 nine others
were added including Banco Agrícola
Sonorense, Banco de Baja California,
Banco de Campeche, Banco de
Matamoros, Banco de Nuevo Laredo,
Banco General de Tabasco, Banco
Guanajuatense and Banco Industrial de
Jalisco.
Sources: Archivo Banamex, Noticias Banamex (#73, 2-Jun-1970), Archivos
Económicos (SHCP) and Excelsior (29-Mar-1957).22
During the late 1960s, associations had an important technological component.
Investment in information technology infrastructure by large banks during the mid-
sixties motivated small banks to approach them. An example of this type of
collaboration was the creation of three independent credit card franchises. In 1968,
Banamex became the first international member of the Interbank Card Association
(ICA), later to become MasterCard International
57. In the US, ICA was the main
competing franchise to card issuing banks collaborating with Bank of America (later
to be called VISA). The formation of ICA differed from that of VISA in being an
association controlled by member banks which took responsibility for promoting the
MasterCard brand and for setting standards for security, authorisation, clearing and
settlement systems between members.  ICA also had an alliance in Europe through
Eurocard and managed to attract banks in Japan.
A second credit card network in México emerged in 1968 as large and medium
size Mexican banks joined around the  Carnet  brand.  These banks were Banco
Comercial Mexicano, Banco de Londres y México, Banco del Atlántico, Banco
Internacional and Banco de Industria y Comercio. Shortly after other medium banks
joined  Carnet, namely Banco Azteca, Banco del País, Banco Longoria, Banco
Mercantíl, and Banco del Ahorro Nacional
58. Yet a third card franchise emerged in
Mexico in the late 1960s. This one encompassed  Banco de  Comercio and its
associated banks.
However, collaboration in Mexican banking sought much more than achieving
scale in technology. A good example of collaboration is Banamex and its associated
local banks, in particular the agreement with Banco de Tuxpam. This bank established
in 1942 in the  north-eastern region of  Tamaulipas with four branches.  Banco de
Tuxpam approached Banamex with the explicit purpose of establishing a ‘mutually
beneficial strategic relationship’. This represented an opportunity to penetrate markets
in which Banamex did not have a solid position and the associate did
59. Although
there is no evidence of when the alliance started, there is evidence of involvement
dating to the early 1960s as Banamex’s directors figure in  Banco de Tuxpam’s Board
of Directors. For instance, in 1962  Ladislao  López  Negrete and in 1968 Salvador
Villar were recorded as being part of Banco de Tuxpam’s Board. At the same time,
the 1960s were years of sustained improvement in the financial performance of Banco
de Tuxpam (see Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1 above). Hence, this is an example of a23
successful co-operation where  Banamex’s intervention was triggered by the
opportunity to learn about customers in a different geographical locations rather than
by financial distress. The small bank benefited from scale and scope advantages of the
larger bank. The small bank also found attractive the possibility of preferential
treatment in the inter-bank market and the transfer of financial expertise. In exchange,
Banco de Tuxpam supplied knowledge and information about local markets and high-
quality loan referrals (more below).
The agreement between Banamex and its associated banks involved the provision
of services that could also had been opened to other banks (such as second party
processing of credit card receivables). The core of the collaboration, however, was a
more complete package of co-operation. First, there were explicit forms of co-
operation exclusive to the associated bank. Second, there were externalities derived
from the alliance that added strategic value to the collaboration agreement.
A form of exclusive co-operation was the provision of trust services. Trusts were
important as an additional service to clients as well as a key element of loan
administration. Another service was the provision of international banking, in which
Banamex had a comparative advantage. Banamex also offered training courses for the
employees of  associated banks.
An important part of strategic collaboration involved rediscounting loans of
associated banks. Apparently, Banamex refused rediscounting loans from banks other
than its associates
60. Rediscounting allowed Banamex to expand its credit activities
while agreements enabled some control over the client’s credit worthiness. The
associated bank would receive funds and manage the service of loans, carrying out the
monitoring and recovery processes. Although rediscounted loans were limited to a
small proportion of the associate’s loan portfolio, rediscounting facilities generated
confidence among the associate’s clients and investors by creating the perception of
augmented financial capabilities as well as signalling the presence of a mechanism
that could prevent solvency problems. It is therefore likely that associated banks had
an incentive to offer their highest quality loans to the rediscounting facility.
Although small banks had an internal auditing department,  Banamex also
provided auditing services to associated entities. Outsourcing internal auditing
allowed associates access to superior skills as well as the transfer of some of those24
skills and expertise (particularly those related to financial procedures and inspection).
Monitoring by a second party also translated into enhanced credibility and better
reputation for the smaller bank. Expertise from Banamex was important especially for
those banks that had appointed large customers and investors (rather than financial
professionals) to their boards and directorates. Expertise combined with the enlarged
financial capabilities of the smaller banks generated positive externalities to the small
bank and created synergy from co-operation.
Negotiation and policing of the agreement was limited to  Banamex and the
affiliated bank. At the same time, evidence is yet to emerge to suggest that  the
creation of a bigger network was ever pursued by  Banamex (as was in the case of
Banco de  Comercio’s network of associates). Apparently, banks that approached
Banamex had the confidence that Banamex would exercise restraint, would respect
the smaller bank’s independence and would show consideration for arms-length co-
operative agreements
61. As a result, collaboration agreements seldom included the
insertion of  Banamex managers in the board of the other bank.  Banamex could
nevertheless require a small participation in the share capital of affiliated banks as
part of the agreement. However, during the 1970s  Banamex ceded its stock
participation in all of the affiliated banks, with the exception of Banco Provincial del
Norte. In fact, as opposed to the Banco Comercial Mexicano and Banco Internacional,
Banamex failed to amalgamate its associates with the creation of financial
conglomerates in 1975
62.
Other associated banks with  Banamex were  Banco del  Sureste, established in
1944 in the southern state of Yucatan, and Banco Agricola e Industrial de  Linares,
established in 1945, in the northern state of Nuevo Leon. Banks which developed
strategic alliances with Banamex but had a more independent relationship were Banco
del Centro, established in 1935 in the central state of San Luis  Potosí,  Banco
Ganadero in the north-eastern state of Veracruz and Banco de Oriente, established in
1944 in the Eastern state of  Puebla.  Banco del Centro started its alliance with
Banamex in 1963. At the same time, however, Banco del Centro also established an
alliance with another relatively large bank, Banco Internacional. The associations of
Banco del Centro with larger entities focused on the provision of services. For
instance, Banamex managed the credit card system of this bank.25
Some independent  financieras also established collaboration agreements with
Banamex. Most notably  Financiera y  Fiduciaria del  Golfo, established in 1946 to
support cattle raising activities in the north-eastern Huasteca region, and Financiera
Peninsular. Before 1967 Financiera Peninsular was Financiera Americana, established
in 1945. In 1967 Financiera Peninsular had financial distress problems that required
capital injections and a restructuring process.
Close competitors of  Banamex also engaged in collaboration agreements. For
instance,  Banco de  Londres y  México developed links with three independent
financieras, that is, financial organisations that were not a direct component of its
business group, namely Financiera de Nuevo León, Financiera del Norte and Crédito
de Monterrey. Alliances with those financieras ensured the bank a better position in
the markets for corporate credit in northern Mexico and particularly amongst
manufacturing interests established around the city of Monterrey. At the same time,
the collaboration ensured that these financieras had preferential access to funds from
retail deposits collected by the bank as well as financial expertise in the placement of
loans.
In summary, associations in Mexican banking encompassed more than
outsourcing agreements for the provision of services. Collaboration was considered to
be of strategic value by informing decisions that could lead to an expansion of the
retail bank branch network. Large banks could offer auditing, trust services and
international banking to its associates. Of greater value for smaller banks, however,
were skills and financial expertise available at larger banks. In return smaller banks
offered market intelligence about local markets and clientele. To a large extent many
of the collaboration agreements tended to be at the initiative of the small bank and
quite opportunistic for the large bank.
  5.ii 
In 1810 the first ‘savings’ bank under control of voluntary managers and trustees
was established in Ruthwell, Scotland. From the beginning savings banks were retail
finance institutions characterised as  mutuals, owned by depositors and generally
operated through democratic guidelines. Savings banks sought to create thrifty habits
amongst small and medium-size savers like craftsmen, house servants or the growing
proletariat, that is, outside banks' target market
63. In the first half of the nineteenth26
century, bank-runs or bank collapses were common so mutual savings banks had no
safe outlet for deposits. To create trust among potential depositors and as a matter of
policy, from 1817 onwards, funds were invested in government bonds or deposited at
the Bank of England.
Savings banks paying interest on deposits (at a rate ranging from 3 to 5 per cent
per annum) proliferated. The number of successful institutions in the British Isles
grew until it reached 645 in 1861
64. Market diversification started as some of these
banks made advances to local authorities, but the Savings Bank Act of 1891 expressly
prohibited this practice. It was not until 1965 that savings banks were allowed to issue
current accounts, undertake the payment of utility bills, and safe guard securities and
valuables, because through out most of its history deposits at savings banks were used
to finance government debt
65.
By 1975 the large number of separate banks had been reduced by amalgamation to
73 loosely tied up in an association with £2,806m in total assets. Five of the banks had
over £100m in assets (25 per cent of amalgamated total), 14 had between £50 and
£100m (35 per cent), 39 between £10 and £50m (38 per cent) and 17 under £10m (2
per cent)
66. Regulatory changes in 1976 further amalgamated independent savings
banks into 19 federated organisations working under a single central institution
(called Trustee Savings Bank or TSB). That same year the TSB became a functional
member of the Banker’s Clearing House
67.
Although together the TSBs would rank in size with any of the four main London
clearing banks, the geographical distribution of their 1,655 retail bank branches was
uneven. The three largest banks were in London and the South East, Glasgow and
Belfast while among the twenty largest many resulted from merges of smaller banks
over a wide area
68. Typically, the north of England would contribute with 50 per cent
of all funds, the south of England and Wales with 27 per cent, Scotland for 19 per
cent and Northern Ireland for less than 5 per cent
69. Branch density, however, was
higher in Scotland and the North of England. Hence, in 1978 there was one retail
saving bank branch per 18,000 persons in Scotland but only one per 75,000 persons in
the otherwise  high density area of London
70. The same pattern emerged from
individual accounts, with two out of five persons in Scotland having a saving bank
account, one out of five in the north of England and one out of twenty in London and
the home countries
71.27
An interesting development was co-operation between the Bank of
Scotland and ten of the largest Scottish trustees savings banks (together accounting
for 95 per cent of Scotland’s saving bank branches). The first to accept the bank’s
invitation was the Savings Bank of Glasgow, the second largest in the UK. It was
followed by those of Edinburgh, Paisely, Perth, and Kirkcaldy. Three months later
they were joined by those of Aberdeen, Dundee, Falkirk and Counties, South of
Scotland, Stirling and Counties.
Through the ‘Scotloan’ scheme, the Bank of Scotland operated and underwrote a
personal instalment loan scheme for customers referred by associated savings banks,
up to a maximum of £1,000 and available to customers of ‘undoubted sufficiency’ for
a period of 6 to 36 months, at 7 per cent interest per annum
72.
The scheme was designed by the Bank of Scotland in July 1971, promoted
privately amongst regional banks, savings banks and finance houses; and advertised in
the national and Scottish press between September and November of 1972
73. The
bank appointed John McNeill, formerly of the Inspector’s Department, as Controller
of the new Savings Bank Loan Centre
74. The collaboration played on the geographic
strengths and customer loyalty of the TSBs and superior financial capabilities at the
bank. Collaboration was also attractive because each TSB bank served a separate
geographic area. There was little competition between savings banks, although they
were actively challenged by other organisations. At the same time, Bank of Scotland’s
main competitors were very much engaged in developing capabilities in international
markets through clubs and consortia with other European banks
75.
Unfortunately, the visionary collaboration in the Scottish banking agreement
failed to deliver significant results. The OPEC-led rise in oil prices and subsequent
inflation together with a secondary banking crisis added to environmental volatility
and uncertainty. At the same time, there was internal instability which involved top
managers in all UK savings banks being very much engaged in deliberations about the
future organisational structure and functioning of the movement as well as individual
savings banks
76. Introspection moved in tandem with government efforts to enhance
the working of savings banks and together gave rise to the publication of the TSB Bill
in 1975, which granted savings banks rights to offer equivalent services to those of
the commercial banks
77. The amalgamation of individual banks into purposely created
regional banks then brought about the introduction of personal lending in 1977 by the28
TSBs
78. However, by 1979 the relentless move of  Giro Bank, the Trustee Savings
Banks and the Co-operative Bank resulted in only just over £200m in direct consumer
loans and this accounted for less than 3 per cent of total consumer lending that year
79.
In summary, for the Bank of Scotland, using savings banks as distributors was a
proactive (i.e. offensive) response to penetrate a previously unexplored market
segment. However, evidence has yet to emerge to support the idea of high
commitment from the savings banks. It would rather seem that collaboration by the
savings banks was a form of defensive co-operation, emerging as a reactive response
to environmental change. Defensive co-operation is often characterised by avoidance
of investment, that is, co-operation is considered a superior alternative for growth to
the time and/or financial resources required to develop capabilities internally.
Avoiding uncertainty is also central to mount a reactive response as co-operation can
provide participants with more time to adjust to environmental turbulence. However,
when collaboration is used as a means of avoiding investment rather than appraising
opportunities, co-operation is unlikely to be successful
80.
  6.  Discussion and Conclusion
The nature of information sharing and learning is central to the formation and
longevity of competitive collaboration. Cases in Mexican and UK banking suggest
that information sharing is also relevant to assess diversification moves with the
potential to deliver new income streams (when tapping into new customer groups or
geographies). Assessing market potential is critical for activities associated with high
sunk costs such as retail branch distribution in post WWII bank markets.
A second issue is the extent to which clearly defined goals and detailed
collaboration agreements could be expected to achieve success. Evidence documented
in this paper as well as that for commercial banks by others
81, would suggest that
maintaining commitment and opportunities to inform activities resulting in
investments with high sunk costs, are more important in the formation stage of
collaboration than detailed agreements, well defined goals and even strategic
foresight. For instance, the visionary intent of both Bank of Scotland to deliver
through TSB and the CPBS to deliver through co-operative retail stores anticipated
foreign operations would under perform returns available in home markets. However,
both these visionary attempts failed to consolidate because of internal turbulence29
within their collaboration partners rather than to poor agreements. At the same time,
the opportunistic collaboration of Banamex with smaller regional banks was managed
through a representative (acting as point of contact) rather than through a written
agreement. However, this type of collaboration but offered the regional player
exclusive access to rediscounting loan facilities in exchange for market intelligence
from geographies where Banamex’s retail bank branch network was to expand.
The configuration of the market and of the competitive space provides different
environmental characteristics and incentives for the collaboration to succeed. In this
story Mexico and UK represent two different competitive spaces. Mexico, due to its
uneven geography and low development of transportation and communication
systems had larger regional barriers to penetrate the markets than the UK. In Mexico
markets were regionally segmented and the national market was little integrated.
Needless to say, the penetration of the banking services into the Mexican population
was low. In the UK, geography and better-developed transportation as well as
communications systems facilitated the operation of financial systems. In addition,
there were information systems that enabled easier exchange of information (about
credit worthiness, for instance), as well as higher penetration of banking services,
particularly checking and payroll services. Hence, participants in Mexican markets
apparently found more incentives to engage and develop collaboration agreements.
Detailed agreements in UK banking seem to achieve little as a way of focusing
efforts in making the collaboration work. At the same time, fuzzy goals backed by
cautious pragmatism and high commitment seem to be the formula behind tactical
(i.e. opportunistic) strategies associated with success in changing competitive
positioning within Mexican bank markets. Detailed collaboration seems to require
greater foresight as well as strict internal discipline to develop relevant skills and
resources. This would suggest that even when partners’ expectations were similar and
reasonably consistent, detailed collaboration is associated with a potential
commitment to invest ex-post in assets unique (i.e. idiosyncratic) to the agreement.
Potential irrecoverable investments in specific physical or organisational assets that
encourage and maintain co-operation (such as mechanisms to share information and
co-ordination) would then explain failure to make co-operation work.
Archival searches also seem to support arguments about the critical importance of
market intelligence for the formation and eventual success of collaboration. In all30
cases documented in this paper, an agreement manager was appointed by the bigger
partner (in terms of assets) but seldom, if ever, did this person seem had to produce
detailed reports on the evolution of the agreement. This suggests that the role of the
agreement manager was predominantly to capture contextual information about the
partner’s market and share implicit knowledge with the partner’s managers. To the
extent that collaboration was successful, the agreement manager spear-headed and co-
ordinated multiple points of contact between collaborators.  If true, this would
reinforce the view that cognitive-individual learning evolves into behavioural-
organisational learning through interactive cycles of doing, evaluation and
adjustment. Moreover, that investments in organisational resources and capabilities to
manage collaboration would follow to the extent that information acquired through
collaboration lowered managers’ perception of failure for decisions involving high
sunk cost investments (such as expanding the retail bank branch network). Hence, the
importance of market intelligence in the formative stages of collaboration can help
explain why the evolution of competitive collaboration can withstand the risk of
environmental turbulence turning organisational investments into sunk costs.
In summary, organisational flexibility associates with a tactical approach to
collaboration. Flexibility can provide collaborators with greater freedom to assess the
potential of (perceived) growth opportunities. Tactical approaches to collaboration
associate with irrecoverable investments but only to the extent that collaboration is
proving to be successful. Hence, engaging tactical collaboration is likelier to be
successful. Vaguely expressed aspirations offer greater possibilities to improve the
competitive position of participants while, at the same time, tactical collaboration is
associated with low or negligible idiosyncratic investments.31
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